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Ever since humankind’s first encounters with animals, from our pre-historic stone age 
relationships with animals, to our current modern day relationship with them, questions 
have always been asked. What is the moral status of animals, and what are the morally 
relevant issues to consider in our relationship with them? Throughout the centuries this 
problem has been dealt with in a variety of ways, from animals only being of 
instrumental value for human kind, to animals being there to be ruled over by those 
created in god’s image, to animals just being mechanic automata, to the more modern 
conception of all living creatures having equal status, to sentient beings being the only 
creatures of moral value, to the biotic community/ecosphere being of value, and not just 
its constitutive parts in isolation, the list goes on. 
 
However one interesting thing to note here, is that these changing viewpoints about our 
moral relationship with animals are not just due to the progress of philosophical 
thought, or non-discriminatory ideals (like slavery, sexism etc.) becoming increasingly 
accepted and thus subjective accounts of our relationship to them being 
paradigmatically shifted; but rather a change in technologies. It is not so much a shift in 
moral thought that has changed our beliefs concerning our moral relationships with 
animals, but technological change.  
 
In the stone age (and even before that) our relationship with animals was fundamentally 
one of survival. Kill or be killed, hunt or starve, our relationship with animals was 
necessarily that we had to kill them in order to survive. Advances in technology 
however, soon meant that people herded animals both for greater food security, 
clothing, as well as for wealth and status. Animals now took on a new relationship to 
us, as stores of value, food stores, work animals, and pets, still fundamentally however 
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After the agricultural revolution however, animals were now used to supplement 
protein in people’s diets, provide gastronomic variation, aesthetically pleasing 
garments, and as a form of currency, animals were now less (but still to a significant 
extent in some areas) “used” for survival purposes, than as personal luxuries. Nomadic 
herders however relied on animals almost as a sole source of nutrition, allowing them to 
survive in areas where no crops would grow. With the end of the dark ages, the 
progression through the enlightenment era, to modern society as we know it today, our 
relationship with animals again changed. As well being used as tools for human social 
progression, and as culinary delicacies, and aesthetic pleasure, animals were now used 
for scientific research, as companion animals to the sick or incapacitated, as well as in 
zoos, where other alternatives could not be found.  
 
Thus in short, our relationship with animals started off as one of survival and necessity, 
quickly spread into our relationship with animals being of personal luxury/satisfaction, 
to then returning to an era where animals are once again used where no other 
alternatives exist to improve human life (but we would not call any of these 
necessities). This is a very simplistic account of our historical relationship to animals, 
and of course there will be a multitude of variations to this account I have expressed, 
but as a general theme of how our relationships with animals progressed I think it is 
both acceptable and usable as a starting point for this review.  
 
Thus in some ways (but definitely not all) our relationship with animals has changed 
due to technological progression, and not purely in moral, logical, or rational 
progression as expounded by many other people (whereby, first was abolition of 
slavery, then racism, then sexism, now speciesism). Our moral relationship with 
animals however, need to be defined in the here and now, as that is what matters now 
and into the future. What should our moral relationship with animals be now, is the 
fundamental question to be asked. This relationship is not to be defined solely as a 
moral progression (a move from speciesism) but rather due to technological progression 
(and as to our reasons/needs for having a relationship of this variety with animals). 
 
Kazez is a staunch defender of what I will call pro-choice vegetarianism, in that she is 
not aggressively vegan, or a believer in radical sentient equality, but rather has certain 
views about the moral status of animals, that leads her to live her life in a mostly 
vegetarian fashion. One of the great things about this book is that it is never dogmatic 
or aggressive in pushing her viewpoints. She herself admits moments of (what she feels 
is) moral weakness of the will in living her everyday life, and acknowledges that yes 
she can do better, but that we all should try and do the best we can given our bounded 
willpower and resources; seeking to promote vegetarianism without being as 
aggressively expansionist in our viewpoints as many other writers. 
 
Animalkind was written to be readily accessible to a wide audience, with little or no 
philosophical knowledge. As such it contains little or no technical jargon, and does not 
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assume any prior knowledge on the subject from the reader. It is written in a lively 
style, with many anecdotes and interesting facts/stories from Kazez's own personal life, 
to lighten up the tone and keep the reader’s interest. While not an extremely rigorous 
philosophical text, the book does manage to get its point across, albeit in a 
(understandably, due to its intended audience) long-winded fashion.  
 
However where it is lacking, is in its philosophical rigour and contemporariness, which 
in part can be explained by its aims to be an introduction to the topic, and not a key text 
in the field. However further discussion of opposing viewpoints and commentary on 
more recent developments in the field would not go astray, as even they can be 
summarized succinctly and in terms readily understandable by the every day person. As 
a first year undergraduate textbook greater interaction with academic texts would be 
useful, too. 
 
The book itself is structured into five parts, beginning with an introduction into our 
treatment of animals and brief justifications (be they mythological or religious) 
throughout history that have been used for this. This is then followed by a survey into 
animal consciousness (drawing on animal psychology and ethology); all in all there is 
nothing new here. The third part on “All Due Respect” however, is where Kazez’s own 
novel theory comes into play. Kazez's contribution to the literature is here, regarding 
her conception of “respect” and it’s role in our treatment of animals, and other human 
beings.  
 
The rest of the book then uses this conception of respect to look at issues of 
experimentation on animals, using animals as a food source and on species 
preservation. For such a readily accessible text, it is nice that it can still contribute 
something quite substantial (in the form of her conception of “respect”) to the 
philosophical literature. The relatively lengthy 14-page annotated sources at the back of 
the book, allows readers who wish to take the subject material further, with a good 
starting point. 
 
Kazez’s overarching theme of the book is that our dealing with any other entities 
should be based entirely on what she calls “respect”, whether it is in dealing with 
inanimate objects, to fellow human beings, to insects, or great apes. This Kazez feels 
should be the cornerstone of any relationships. Respect however is a very hard concept 
to define, and Kazez struggles here, and thus the benefit of her theory seems to be that 
the vagueness with which “respect” is defined, gives it the flexibility to support the 
conclusions that she draws surrounding or relationship with animals. It seemingly has 
much in common with Fox’s theory of Responsive Cohesion (Warwick Fox, A Theory 
of General Ethics, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006), which unfortunately is never 
mentioned in the text. However unlike Fox's theory, Kazez’s concept of “respect” is 
defined by relatively concrete functions of self-preservation and social contract theory, 
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as well as other limiting factors, thus doing away with any fatal flaw based on a 
vagueness critique.  
 
Drawing on these factors of self-preservation, capacities and social contract theory, and 
breaking them down into a form of (weighted) moral currency based on respect, allows 
it to solve many dilemmas concerning our treatment of animals (and each other for that 
matter). In a way, her concept of “respect” almost has virtue ethics tendencies in that it 
is not deontological in nature, nor consequentialist, but rather based on whether the 
agent is acting out of respectful motivations or not, and whether the agent is 
exemplifying respectful character.  
 
Respect here seems to encompass all other forms of virtue (be they kindness, modesty, 
courage, compassion, tolerance), and thus in a way, Kazez’s argument looks much the 
like an argument a virtue ethicist might out forward for our dealing with animals and 
other entities Her one difference here however, is that she does use utilitarian 
considerations when weighing up some courses of action (for example, experimentation 
with animals). Thus on the whole it seems that her theory is virtue ethics like in nature 
(albeit re-labled with the name respect, instead of virtue), but bounded by 
consequentialist considerations – though interestingly enough, Kazez never even 
mentions this connection to Virtue Ethics at all.  
 
To Kazez, the main factor to look at concerning our moral relationship with animals is 
consciousness; she says that, “the greatest difference possible, is the difference made by 
consciousness. If we have it and animals don’t, then we are most assuredly in totally 
separate moral categories” (p.37). 
 
Kazez argues, that like Gazzaniga (Michael Gazzaniga, Human: The Science of What 
Makes Us Unique. New York: Harper Collins, 2008) she believes that there may be 
neural routes to consciousness other than those in the human brain that lead to different 
types of consciousness, saying that “Animals, accomplish temperature regulation with 
hair, feathers, sweat, shivering...migration, intelligence.... Structurally, these are all 
drastically different from each other, but they get the same job done” (p.42). Thus 
concluding that just because our brains might be markedly different to other animals 
(invertebrates, non-mammals to) does not mean that they do not have consciousness. 
Even today, the hard problem of consciousness and the search for the neural correlates 
of consciousness is now where near being solved, so Kazez’s argument does hold some 
weight concerning many people’s attempt to write off animals as not having 
consciousness just because their brains are different to ours. 
 
However later on in the same chapter, Kazez makes a strange move, saying that it 
would be “[strange] if consciousness had evolved in the human animals and no others. 
If there are physical preconditions for our consciousness, there’s no good reason to 
think they are met in us, and in none of our animals relatives. So a vast number of 
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animal species, including mammals, birds, fish, and reptiles, can reasonably be 
assumed to posses conscious awareness” (p.49). She provides no further justification 
for this argument than what is stated above.   
 
Why it is strange that feature X can evolve in one certain species of creature, and not 
others is not in anyway mysterious, and even if it were, Kazez, provides no argument as 
to why. Definitionally, if an elephant (of which there are many varieties, Indian 
elephants, African elephants etc.) has a trunk, this does not mean that by probability 
other species (non-elephants) have trunks, similarly if human beings (be they 
Australian, African, Indian etc.) possess consciousness this does not mean that by 
probability other species should, too. While I agree that it is highly likely other animals 
do posses consciousness (for similar biological or evolutionary reasons), Kazez reasons 
(or lack of) do not go into this. It is rather an unjustified statement she presents. 
 
The fundamental building blocks of her theory are roughly summed up when she says, 
“The better we understand human morality, as opposed to moral philosophy, the more 
we understand moralizing as routed in our basic instincts, attitudes, and emotions. 
Seeing morality that way also reveals elements of morality in non-human animals” 
(p.72) Thus to Kazez, morality is not some highly intellectual pursuit residing solely in 
the domains of creatures with great cognitive abilities, but rather someone accessible to 
any creature capable of instincts, and emotions.  
 
What this also means, though, is that morality is not just to be found in rational thought, 
reason and logic, but also in intuition, passion, and emotion. Kazez argues that empathy 
forms a large part of this concept of respect (and thus her moral theory), this again 
harks back to its virtue ethics routes in an almost intuitionist fashion, much like the 
virtue ethics of care outlined by Walker and Ivanhoe. (R.L. Walker and P.J. Ivanhoe, 
Working Virtue: Virtue Ethics and Contemporary Moral Problems, Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 2007). 
 
In part 2 of the book, fittingly entitled “All Due Respect”, Kazez outlines her theory of 
respect beginning with a critique of desire centred approaches for accounting for the 
differences between human beings and other animals. Kazez believes that there is a 
morally justifiable distinction between humans and animals based on the assumption 
that humans have a higher “capacities” to achieve, and not on the assumption that 
humans are able to have more preferences satisfied.  
 
However there is a tight inter-linkage between these two assumptions that she doesn’t 
really account for. Having higher capacities (to write poetry, to play Symphony 
Number 9, to solve Fermat’s Last Theorem) etc. necessarily entails the possibility of 
greater (quantitatively) preference satisfaction due to more desires being available.  
Benthamites might even argue (qualitatively) that preferences to groom my mane in the 
shade are lower than those to bring my opponent to checkmate in eight moves.  
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Trying to criticize this desire-centered view, she says that, “with a smaller set of 
desires, generally there are fewer satisfied desires in the normal course of an animal’s 
life, but also fewer unsatisfied desires. Animal lives don’t stand any chance of being as 
good as the best human lives... or as bad as the worst ones” (p.84). This for her is what 
she believes to be the fatal flaw in desire centred theories, that “If you don’t want 
much, are you automatically worse off than someone who wants a lot, and get it?” 
(p.84). She goes on to say that “It’s not entirely clear what birds desires, but their lives 
seem to go better when they can make use of their natural potentials”(capacities) (p.84) 
as an attempt to draw out the differences between desires and capacities, but it doesn’t 
really achieve this.  
 
What can also be argued here – a line Benatar would take (David Benatar, Better Never 
to Have Been, New York: Oxford University Press, 2006) is that someone with a lot of 
preferences which are all satisfied, is at the same level of welfare as someone who has 
very few preferences which are all satisfied. As satisfying a preference just brings you 
back to the level you were at before you even had the preference. 
 
The main flaw to Kazez however, is that desire-fulfilment theories do not separate 
between value “over a lifetime” and “built in” value. Desire-fulfilment theories, Kazez 
argues, just use a value “over a lifetime” view when weighing up decisions. But what is 
wrong with this? She tries to give an argument where Bill Gates can donate money to 
group A (who are very poor, and living in destitute conditions) or group B (who are 
relatively poor people living in a first world country). He foresees that the money he 
gives to group A doesn’t really do much as it still results that “their future will be 
relatively bleak”, he also foresees that the money he gives to group B will be destined 
to bring them greatness. Kazez argues that Bill Gates would choose then to give money 
to group B (a good business strategy she days) but that she feels the money should 
actually be given to group A, saying that “I would rather see Gates make a decision 
based on the basic value of lives, the built-in value that doesn’t depend on 
circumstances or how things will go in the future” (p.85). Kazez feels (intuitively) that 
we should give the money to group A regardless, and tries to say that a desired centred 
approach would dictate that group B gets the money and not group A. 
 
It seems however that there are two ways of interpreting this problem, and regardless of 
which way we take, a capacity centred approach is not the only way out, and 
furthermore a desire centred approach actually solves the problem better. The first 
interpretation is that group A has such bad lives that the money they get doesn’t do 
them any good as they die of a disease three months later, whereas those in group B 
keep on living fulfilling lives for another 60 years. The second interpretation is that 
group A increases their prospects from being totally uneducated with no health care 
system or wells and running water, to having drop toilets, a communal well, a 
community nurse, and basic education up to year six. Group B on the other hand 
increases their prospects from lack of Medicaid, no text books for high schools, and 
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lack of internet, to having full medical insurance, a full scholarship to complete medical 
and law school, and becoming a professor at Harvard University.  
 
On the first interpretation (where Kazez feels giving to group A is more morally correct 
than giving to group B), this leads you wide open to the consequentialist reply that we 
should be basing our decisions on how the world really is, and not some blindly 
idealistic view (so as not to waste resources). Knowing the outcome of your decision, 
but refusing to acknowledge it or give it any moral weight when deciding, is blindly 
make an ill-informed decision on purpose. Imagine a scientist of judge making a 
decision, but purposely leaving out facts when making their decision, that they know 
full well to exist.   
 
On interpretation B (where Kazez still feels that giving to group A is more morally 
correct than giving to group B), Kazez also does not acknowledge that decreasing 
marginal utility of money also plays a major role, whereby $1000 to a millionaire will 
(in most cases) bring less preference-satisfaction than to a poor starving person in a 
third world country. And thus even on a desire centred approach, the giving to group A 
in preference to group B would be chosen. This seemingly allows another way out of 
the conflict she sees in the though experiment she creates. Thus her justification for 
using a capacities centred approach compared to a desire or preference centred 
approach to defining the moral difference between humans and animals collapses, as 
this is the only argument she uses to support it.  
 
To Kazez, “Intelligence, autonomy, creativity, nurturing, skill, resilience, and 
innumerable other assets illicit respect, and so (in a low-level imperceptible way) does 
consciousness itself” (p.93). Thus at a very bare minimum, even something with 
minimal consciousness and lacking all other assets, is still entitled to some form of 
respect. This is something very pertinent to her argument. 
 
Kazez is very clear that humans are morally distinct from animals, and thus are entitled 
to different considerations.  She says,“Animals are not just humans with reduced 
capacities. They have their own capacities, their own spectrum of attitudes and 
behaviours. No, an impaired human being is not very much like a normal chimpanzee” 
(p.95). Thus to Kazez it is potentiality that matters not actuality.  She goes on to say, 
“The disabled may have lost powers, or may have never had them; they’ve had worse 
luck than others. A normal chimpanzee by contrast, has lost nothing and is not unlucky. 
When people are impaired – less capable than before, or than they ‘should’ have been – 
we don’t simply think of them as sui generis, simply as the kind of thing they’ve come 
to be” (p.96). 
 
What happens to a child who is born impaired however, as it seems Kazez is only 
referring to those cases where a “normal” person later becomes impaired, and thus 
“loses” something. To a child born impaired, they might well have the same capacities, 
Essays Philos (2011) 12:1                                                                                                       Chao | 182 
 
 
or elements that illicit respect (intelligence, autonomy, creativity, nurturing, skill, 
resilience) as a “normal” chimpanzee, if not less. So why should the chimpanzee be 
thought of as “lower” than the child, if capacities and the elements that make up respect 
are what matter? If our relationship with animals is built around respect, and our moral 
difference to animals are our capacities; and if an animal has more and qualitatively 
better capacities, and more and qualitatively better of the elements that make up 
respect, it seems entirely contradictory to say that the handicapped child should be 
valued more than the normal chimpanzee. 
 
Furthermore why should a purported potentiality that never has the means to actualize 
be given any moral weight? It’s like a diamond ring, but with the diamond missing, 
costing the same amount as a diamond ring without the diamond missing, it just doesn’t 
make sense that the potential “diamond” should be factored into the price of the ring. 
So why should the potential capacities or elements of respect (properties of the child) 
that will never eventuate, be factored into the properties (and thus value) that the child 
actually consists of. 
 
Kazez uses her conception of respect to give justification as to why it is legitimate for a 
starving caveman to kill an animal, because the self-respect he has, and the respect for 
his family members (who are also starving), is less than the respect the animal has. 
Thus using this as a case study, Kazez now outlines the method in which to weigh up a 
course of action: 
 
1. Ask, “whether we have self respecting goals in doing so. Is it a ‘mere  
           desire’ that’s motivating us, or do we have a more serious and  
           compelling goal connected to self-respect and respect for others?”   
           (p.106) 
2. Ask, “what level of respect must we have for the potential victim?” 
           (p.106) 
 
Thus weighing up these two considerations will (in Kazez’s opinion) give us an ability 
to decide the correct course of action.  
 
To counter the possibility of it being right for someone to kill one person to harvest 
their organs to save the lives of many, Kazez also puts in this clause: “Human are 
virtually inviolable, almost never expendable just to satisfy the needs of another. 
Animals are bits of the natural world, almost always expendable to satisfy the needs of 
another (human or animal)” (p.107).  Not that under this conception, this 
“expendability” need not only include a life, but also other elements that make up the 
entity in question. Thus placing human beings in a position well above other animals 
(who are seen as mere “bits of the natural world”), since they have (almost) inviolable 
rights to life, whereas animals have (almost) inviolable duties to have their lives used 
by others – or as Kazez says “We are related, as sacred to profane” and “...animals exist 
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to feed us. They are in another class altogether. Humans, on the other hand, are utterly 
misunderstood if construed as food” (p.107), – an Aristotelian view. 
 
Kazez actually uses this to solve the problem of predation. She says, “Whales can kill 
krill, cats can maybe kill mice, but the lion who dines on the gazelle...are unwitting 
transgressors” (p.108) and that “yes, it’s wrong, but of course it’s also natural.” Thus 
Kazez seems to think that whales can rightly kill krill and cat can rightly kill mice 
(since they have very few of the elements that make up respect and very few 
capacities), but that lions are wrong in killing gazelle (because they have many more 
elements that make up respect and many more capacities). However she goes on to say 
that regarding this problem, that “moralizing” is intrusive, and that we should just 
“leave nature alone.” 
 
 However, moralizing in itself is not actually wrong (like Kazez thinks it is), but rather 
acting to intervene is wrong. Moralizing itself does no wrong, as we have already 
agreed that it is morally wrong for the lion to kill the gazelle, so there can be nothing 
wrong about moralizing about this, unlike what Kazez says. What is wrong is the act of 
stopping the killing. Imagine there is a young child going to rob an old lady in her 
house and steal a CD of hers. Our only way of stopping it (we can see it from a far, but 
have no mobile phone, or any other means of communication around) is by shooting 
him in the head with a sniper rifle.  
 
It is morally wrong for the child to rob the old lady, it is not morally wrong for us to 
moralize about this, but it is morally wrong to intervene to stop the happening with the 
only means we have available. Thus while act X might be morally wrong, intervening 
to stop action X, by using action Y can also be morally wrong, resulting in us having to 
allow a morally wrong action. Thus is seems there is nothing wrong with us moralizing 
about the situations in question, the only thing that is wrong is intervening in them in 
the wrong manner (if at all). 
 
What is different to Kazez’s views compared to most other environmental ethicists is 
that she sees the need for vegetarianism (if not veganism), but also acknowledges the 
need for scientific experimentation on animals. Most vegetarians/vegans would 
normally see these two positions as diametrically opposed, but Kazez’s theory enables a 
justification for both (or so she believes). However again, it is her theory that lets her 
down in the long run, with the contradictions we outlined earlier. 
  
If it is acceptable to perform scientific experiments (causing pain) on animals, then 
surely human beings with less capacities and elements that can illicit respect should be 
used in preference. Kazez tries to defend this using her version of social contract 
theory. Regarding these impaired human beings she says, “Now, children and the 
incapacitated don’t have the attributes of reason and self-interest, so can’t be thought of 
as parties to this sort of agreement. It’s up to the normal adult framers to determine 
Essays Philos (2011) 12:1                                                                                                       Chao | 184 
 
 
their status. But knowing that this decision could affect their own relatives and children 
and even possibly themselves, it makes sense for the framers to be generous, giving 
them full rights” (p.110).  
 
Thus Kazez’s justification for not performing experiments on these impaired children is 
that people (when making a social contract) could imagine themselves, or their relatives 
being used in experiments in this fashion, and not wanting this, create a social contract 
to protect those individuals from being used in this manner (an argument from 
selfishness). Kazez argues that a similar social contract would not be made with 
animals (as you could never be turned into an animal). And thus since we have a social 
contract with all members of our society (no matter how impaired) but not with any 
animals, it is right to use animals for scientific experiments but not fellow human 
beings. Thus this social contract add-on, is in reality a trump card for her theory of 
respect. Even if the animal is due more respect from its higher capacities, the existence 
of the social contract trumps this.  
 
However this is not a sound argument. Imagine old-world America, where slavery was 
rampant. You could on Kazez’s principle, justify slavery of people from West Africa 
(who themselves, had no means to enslave the people in America). Many people might 
object to this example, saying that the slaves wouldn’t agree to this, or that by saying 
slavery is OK might lead to you (or your family) being enslaved one day, and thus for 
your own protection you wouldn’t agree to slavery being OK as part of a social 
contract. But these are not the parameters Kazez uses. For Kazez it does not matter if 
the animals don’t agree to being experimented on (painful procedures which they very 
much dislike), and it doesn’t matter that we think that experimentation on any live 
subject in general is wrong, as we are only talking about experimenting on animals (a 
sub category), not live subjects (the wider class) in general.  
 
In a similar way, is does not matter if the slaves don’t agree or want to be enslaved, and 
we aren’t saying slavery in general is OK, only slavery of West Africans (and thus we 
don’t have to fear that we ourselves will be enslaved one day). Thus using Kazez’s 
reasoning for social contract theory, it would mean that under these circumstances 
enslaving West Africans would be all right. Something we find abominable. Thus it 
seems that Kazez’s argument to justify animal experimentation but not experimentation 
on handicapped humans is not sound, as it could be used to justify experimentation on 
any oppressed minority group. 
 
Kazez also seems to take a totalised capacity approach to ethics, saying, “If 
chimpanzees capacities have value then it makes sense to want there to be 
chimpanzees. The fact that there are chimpanzees adds goodness to the world” (p.161), 
but this seems to leave her wide open to the objection commonly thrown at total 
utilitarians, from just creating more and more living beings, to the repugnant conclusion 
If capacities are what are of fundamental value, then shouldn’t we just choose the 
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creatures with the highest capacities (human beings, as Kazez herself says) and 
populate the world with them, as much as possible? This however has many difficulties 
as we have outlined, and also carries over into the next problem I will outline below. 
  
Kazez then moves on to talk about the world and species diversity. She writes, “Say 
that I am creating a book collection...I may judge Tolstoy to be the best author, but I 
will surely not want the collection to contain nothing but Tolstoy. Even worse would be 
a collection consisting of Anna Karenina many times over. A collection is better for 
containing many kinds of good, instead of a huge amount of one kind.” However this 
has no carry-over into the real world we live in today. The best world is not the best 
collection.  
 
Kazez wrongly assumes these two concepts are identical. Sure the best “collection” of 
books would be one with the largest range. But the best “world” would not necessarily 
be one with the largest range. “Best” is a relative term, when referring to a “book 
collection” it has a different meaning than when referring to a world we inhabit. Would 
a billion different varieties of insects, a billion different varieties of invertebrates, a 
billion different varieties of single cellular creatures, and a billion different varieties of 
plants, but no humans or great apes, or mammals, really be of more value than what we 
have today (where the species diversity is a lot smaller)? 
 
Let us use Kazez’s theory of respect for example. When referring to the real world, the 
“best” world would be the world that has the most capacities and elements that illicit 
respect. Wouldn’t this mean then, a world primarily made up of human beings? Thus 
on Kazez’s own theory, it seems to entail something completely opposite to what she 
wants. She believes in species diversity (using the book collection analogy) but what 
her theory entails is a world containing a lot more homogeneity, since human beings are 
the creatures with the highest capacities and elements that illicit respect. 
  
She tries to justify her viewpoint in a contradictory fashion as well, saying that “Other 
species do great things for us...they teach us lessons...The study of animals tells us 
much about ourselves. If you’re interested in male and female behaviour, it’s got to be 
illuminating to study rutting deer, attentive emperor penguin fathers, lions that kill cubs 
before taking over a pride” (p.163). I can maybe understand that it might be possible 
the rutting deer and the attentive emperor penguin fathers might be illuminating for us, 
but the lions that kill their cubs? Do lions that kill their cubs really teach us that much 
about male and female behaviour, enough to outweigh the harm done to the cubs 
killed?  
 
Doesn’t this just seem selfish and speciesist, to say that we value species diversity 
because lions killing their cubs benefits us? Doesn’t this seem in the slightest cruel? If 
the reason we value species diversity is that watching lions kill their cubs benefits us, 
isn’t that a sign of disrespect? We’re pretty much using them as a means to our own 
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benefit, using their suffering for our own satisfaction. Either way you look at it (using 
Kazez’s theory, or using other moral theories) it seems selfishly and blindingly wrong. 
Knowing that lions kill their cubs before taking over a pride is much less essential to 
our well-being (compared to killing an animal for food, or medical experimentation). 
Thus using her theory, we cannot derive the conclusions that she wants.  
 
Thus on the whole it seems that Kazez does indeed have a novel theory that sits well 
with our intuitions, whilst at the same time not being overly aggressive in its approach 
(more due to her personality/writing style than her theory, though). However while 
soundness of her arguments does leave her theory open to much criticism, the theory as 
a whole does seem capable of standing alone – with a bit more fleshing out, 
explanation, and rigorous argument. With greater explanation and 
argument/justification for her positions, it could well turn into a more intuitively 
acceptable ethical theory, where many of the other ethical theories today do entail 
counter intuitive results. Her theory seems to be in the very early phases, and thus does 
have quite a few minor (and some larger) flaws, but these can be readily dealt with, to 
make it a more defensible and comprehensive theory with a bit more work. 
 
Animal ethics has come a long way since the animal liberation movement first began, 
and will continue to progress, both as technology advances, and moral theory evolves. 
Ethics should never be construed as an unchanging field, and unless we keep 
researching and working in it, technology will change, but the ethics will not keep up 
with it. We must therefore keep the field of ethics progressing, and thus in this spirit 
Kazez should be praised. In a continually evolving technological sphere, our 
relationship with animals keeps taking on changing moral statuses; it is only if morality 
progresses at the same rate as technological innovation that we will escape from being 
left behind in the immoral darkness that has engulfed many of our predecessors. 
 
